2 comments about First Thoughts: Life and Letters of Abigail Adams.

1. Abigail Adams: A Writing Life by Edith B. Gelles (Senior Scholar, Institute for Research on Women and Gender, Stanford University) is a careful, articulate, scholarly analysis of the literary and historical work of Abigail Adams, the wife of John Adams and mother of John Quincy Adams. Half biography, half literary criticism, Abigail Adams: A Writing Life studies Mrs. Adams' letters as literature and looks at her correspondence in-depth. A marvelous portrayal of a unique woman in America's history, Abigail Adams: A Writing Life is highly recommended for Women's Studies and American Literary Studies supplemental reading lists and academic reference collections.



2. This was a great book to really get to see what went on in the life of a great American heroine, Abigail Adams. After reading this book to help with a school project on women in history, I thought, "Who was really wearing the pants in the Adams family?"

No comments about The Trials of Mrs. Lincoln.

No comments about Confederate Pathway to the Pacific: Major Sherod Hunter and Arizona Territory, C.S.A.

2 comments about Loves of Harriet Beecher Stowe.

1. Every American should read this book. It came to me as a gift, and, to be frank, I took it up reluctantly. I mean, who wants to read about a sanctimonious busybody, once influential, now largely forgotten but for her famous book fluttered before your face in junior high? Within pages, that question became its opposite: who doesn't? Having picked the book up, I couldn't put it down. The story is utterly absorbing, filled with passion, filled with pathos - religious fervor, Civil War, its prelude, its aftermath, the Gilded Age. It is the story of public triumph - that famous book again, plus many others - and private grief - the drowning of a beloved son, the disappearance of another in San Francisco, pursued by demons, the trials of a famous brother. The writing is brilliant, even breathtaking, like some wild Disney ride, but that is not what distinguishes the book. What does is the organization of voices, events, incidents, themes. All are woven into a seamless tapestry made up of many, many intensely colored threads. The rush of narative delights, but ultimately it is the intricate pattern that holds your attention. A perfect giift for anyone interested in 19 c. America.
   
   PS Ignore that foolish review in PW.



2. "I love everybody," Harriet Beecher Stowe once told an acquaintance. Of course, this wasn't entirely true, for there were certainly those she didn't like at all. But love was surely a motivating force in her life. "She was impelled by love," wrote her son Charles, "and did what she did, and wrote what she did, under the impulse of love."
   And thus we have Loves of Harriet Beecher Stowe, the title of Phillip McFarland's excellent new biography. McFarland's book focuses on those Mrs. Stowe loved most: her husband, Calvin Stowe; her father, Lyman Beecher; and her famous brother, Henry Ward Beecher. There were many others she loved, of course, including her children, her other siblings, and her many friends. But by focusing on these three men, McFarland enables us, in a highly original way, to understand Mrs. Stowe and what drove her.
   She wrote the most important, influential book of the 19th century -- Uncle Tom's Cabin. She also penned several other novels and countless articles in magazines and newspapers. That she managed to write much of this while keeping house and raising little ones is nothing short of remarkable. But then, as one learns from reading this book, Harriet Beecher Stowe was a remarkable woman.
   Phillip McFarland is one of the premier biographers in the U.S. today. His previous biographies on Nathaniel Hawthorne and Henry Wadsworth Longfellow were critically acclaimed, though they did not make any best-seller lists. Loves of Harriet Beecher Stowe adds to his reputation. McFarland writes beautiful prose, and he has an exceptional ability to get inside his subject. Read this book, and you will come to know Harriet Beecher Stowe intimately.

No comments about George W. Alexander and Castle Thunder: A Confederate Prison and Its Commandant.

No comments about Famous Confederate Generals and Leaders of the South: A Myreportlinks.Com Book (The American Civil War).

No comments about Norton Parker Chipman: A Biography of the Andersonville War Crimes Prosecutor.

2 comments about The Military Memoirs of General John Pope (Civil War America).

1. Peter Cozzens and Robert Girardi provided an excellent service to Civil War scholars by assembling the collected newspaper essays that General John Pope wrote in way of reflecting on his Civil War career. Best known for his stunning defeat at Second Bull Run and his bravado, a very different Pope emerges here. Often witty, Pope left excellent sketches of President Lincoln (an old friend of the family), Edwin Stanton, as well as numerous commanders of both the North and the South. Pope is excellent in capturing the chaos and incompetence of John Fremont's command in Missouri in the first days of the war. His scathing attack on Henry Halleck's torturously slow move towards Corinth reveals the extent of this wasted opportunity. But Pope is best known for two battles: Island Number 10 and Second Bull Run. His account of Island Number 10 is a bit rushed though certainly through. While Pope does an excellent job of describing the layout of his forces at the start of the Bull Run campaign, he relies on official records a bit too much and seems willing to let the matter slide. That is understandable, after all Pope was humiliated by Lee at Second Bull Run. The problem is that the Second Bull Run campaign was Pope's moment in the sun and he has little to say on it. With the large exceptions of George McClellan and Fitz John Porter, who Pope believed deliberately undermined his command, there is little bitterness. Even Nathaniel Banks, who picked a fight at Cedar Mountain against Pope's orders and was mauled by Stonewall Jackson, comes off relatively unscathed. It seems as if all of Pope's fire was being saved for McClellan and Porter, as can be seen in the memoirs as well as in a correspondence with the Comte de Paris which is included in an appendix. The memoirs reveal Pope to be much more intelligent and witty than his traditional blowhard persona would indicate though the bile is still there certainly in the cases of Porter and McClellan. One can see from these memoirs why so many men, including Grant and Sherman, seemed to like and respect Pope and while others had no use for the man. All in all, an interesting and revealing memoir to some long neglected parts of the war though be warned the main course, Second Bull Run, remains a bit bland.



2. Peter Cozzens rightly compares General John Pope's memoires with those of U.S. Grant and W.T. Sherman. This is a highly readable account from one of the participants in some of the least-understood episodes of the Civil War.

   Of course, Pope's writings are not "new." As Cozzens relates, the entries which make up this book appeared in the National Tribune and other Reconstruction-era publications. However, they have spent the last century forgotten by the general public. Cozzens and his colleague, Gerardi, have done a great service both to Civil War scholars and to the casual Civil War buff by bringing Pope's reminiscences and analyses to life.

   What is most surprising is the humor, candor and generosity of a man who has gone down in history as a narrow, bitter mediocrity. For example, devotees of General Lee, whose comments largely consigned Pope to history almost as a barbarian, will be surprised to read Pope's poetic evocation of the beauty of Virginia and the nobility of its citizens.

   In a similar vein, readers will benefit from a "fresh" take on a wide range of issues -- such as the relationships between Lincoln, Stanton, Halleck and McClellan -- from a player very much in the know, but whose views have gone largely unremarked.

   My only cautionary note would be that an appreciation of this volume depends upon a basic understanding of the events of the war, and perhaps also upon an introductory familiarity with the post-war debates on those events.

No comments about The Campaigns of Walker's Texas Division.

5 comments about George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon.

1. Has anyone of so much purported skill and promise failed so spectacularly at such a critical moment in American history as General George B. McClellan? If there is, I can't imagine who it would be. Douglas MacArthur comes to mind as a possible analogue (indeed, Harry Truman turned to Lincoln's dealing with McClellan for inspiration in dealing with MacArthur), but at least MacArthur ultimately prevailed in the Pacific in WWII and can at least point to Inchon as a moment of triumph.
   
   This biography is heralded as scrupulously balanced and fair. If so, few actors on such a large stage have had so few redeeming qualities, the fascist and communist dictators of the twentieth century included. The man that Stephen Sears describes is incorrigible - there is no other word for it. Sears paints a portrait of a fool. Several Union generals matched wits and nerve with Robert E. Lee and suffered humiliating defeat, but such men as Ambrose Burnside were, at least, self-aware. They recognized the enormity of their task, felt inadequate, but pressed ahead to the greatest of their ability to fulfill their duty. McClellan, as Sears portrays him, was delusional. His arrogance and conceit were colossal. As he stumbled from one miscue to the next - and the Lincoln administration fretted over how to prod their field general into action - McClellan was convinced that history would confirm his genius and place him in the pantheon of military greats. Not American military greats, mind you, but alongside the likes of Napoleon, Caesar, and Hannibal.
   
   The only positive things that Sears has to say about McClellan is that he was not disloyal to the Union (he was committed to seeing re-union as a precondition to peace with the South, but disagreed vehemently with the Emancipation Proclamation), he never intentionally contributed to the defeat of another Union general, such as Pope at Second Manassas, and he had a loving and tender relationship with his wife. Beyond that, this biography is essentially an indictment of McClellan's military conduct at the head of the Army of the Potomac and his character as a military officer and human being.
   
   What this biography fails to do is explain why so many people - from the front ranks of business, politics and the military - thought so highly of McClellan, so consistently and for so long. McClellan was one of the highest paid railroad executives in the country while in his early 30s. He received the vigorous patronage, as Sears describes it, of Jefferson Davis when he was secretary of war in the Pierce administration and Salmon Chase when he was secretary of the treasury in the Lincoln administration, but Sears never describes how or why those relationships developed or why those men had such confidence in McClellan. When the Civil War broke out, the governors of the three largest states in the Union - New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio - all turned to McClellan as their first pick to lead their state militias. McClellan clearly had the ability to impress intelligent and experienced men - the type of men one would expect to be good judges of talent and character - yet the reader gets no sense of this from the Sears biography. Moreover, for all of the failure and hardship endured by the Army of the Potomac while under McClellan's command, the rank-and-file largely remained loyal to the general, often enthusiastically so.
   
   Sears emphasizes several themes throughout the biography. First, McClellan had utter disdain for civilian control of the military and the performance of non-regulars in the army, an opinion that emerged during his early days of service in Mexico and that he carried, unaltered, through the Civil War and to his grave. Second, McClellan harbored a personal animus against his superior, Abraham Lincoln. He felt that Lincoln was his social and intellectual inferior (McClellan regularly referred to Lincoln as "the gorilla" in his correspondence with his wife), and resented the commander-in-chief's meddling in military matters. Third, Sears argues that McClellan was paralyzed by the unknown and unexpected. If a maneuver met with unanticipated resistance or a plan seemed to go awry, McClellan's impulse was to freeze and react to enemy movements. Sears frequently contrasts McClellan's timidity with Lee's flexibility in the face of regular surprises and setbacks. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Sears stresses how badly the Army of the Potomac intelligence apparatus, run by Allan Pinkerton, failed to understand the order of battle of the Confederate Army of Virginia. Throughout McClellan's tenure as commander, the general belief was that the Union troops were outnumbered by as much as two-to-one, when the reverse was usually the case. The catastrophic intelligence failure of the Union (and McClellan's eagerness to believe the inflated numbers) raises the question: if McClellan had accurate intelligence on Confederate numbers, would it have changed his behavior and battle plans? Sears never addresses that question directly, but one can anticipate his response: no, it wouldn't have changed anything.
   
   Political scientists Eliot Cohen and John Gooch argue in "Military Misfortunes" that readers should be suspicious of the "man-in-the-dock" explanation to failure on the battlefield. In short, large scale military failure is rarely the result of one man's actions (or inactions). Yet, it seems to me that McClellan has been squarely put in the dock by history for the failures of the Union forces on the Peninsula and for not destroying the Army of Virginia at Antietam after receiving Special Order 191. Is that fair? This biography suggests that the answer is "yes," but I'm not convinced. I'm no fan of McClellan, but there had to be more to this man than Sears conveys here.



2. Stephen W. Sears proves once again that he is a master of Civil War histories. A must ead for students of America's greatest conflect.



3. Billed as neither an indictment nor an apologia, Sears makes it pretty plain that George B. McClellan was a failure as a military leader. Overly cautious, slow to act, seeing the worst in every situation, McC was probably his own worst enemy. It's easy to see why so many of the soldiers liked him, though: fighting with McC meant there was a good chance you wouldn't see much action and if you did it was with the utmost planning for the soldiers' safety and well-being. He always thought he was outnumbered by the enemy and let opportunities for victory slip quickly through his fingers. Sears makes the point that McC always planned his campaigns and battles as if facing an overwhelming enemy force, and in that regard they were superb plans. Unfortunately, that wasn't the way it was on the field. Antietam probably should have been McC's best chance to destroy Lee's army and perhaps end the war then and there, but he squandered every opportunity and left a third of his army in reserve. Even worse, and what surely makes the man detestable, was his tremendous ego and feelings of self-importance. Sears' biography covers McC's entire life, though 90% of it deals with the Civil War years. Well written and interesting.



4. History and historians have, on the whole, not been very kind to Major General George B. McClellan. Lately a trend, or better, the beginning of a trend, can be discerned in Civil War historiography towards a kinder view of McClellan. I'm referring to books like: "McClellan's War" by professor Ethan S. Rafuse, the book on McClellan by professor Thomas Rowland and to the 3 books on the Army of the Potomac by Russell Beatie.
   All these books are very good and offer many valuable insights.
   
   Yet I remain convinced that the reputation of George B. McClellan is quite beyond saving and that that there is only one man who comes in for the lion's share of blame for this: George B. McClellan.
   
   On the plus side, and this has to be acknowledgded, McClellan never got near enough credit for his greatest achievement: he MADE the Army of the Potomac. He really did, and it was a magnificent job, considering the time he had to do it in.
   So often we read about McClellan: "oh well he was a great organizer, but a very bad general" but that -unfairly- belittles his tremendous skills in that respect. So more kudos to McClellan for that. It is very, very hard to organize, to build, to equip arm, feed and clothe an army, and then to train and drill it in preparation for it's deadly work. Then of course there was another task: he had to select it's leaders, from the senior command level on down. Don't think to lightly about this. McClellan did so superbly. He gave men like John Gibbon, George Meade, Henry Hunt, Rufus Ingalls, John Buford, Winfield Scott Hancock, John Sedgewick, Charles Griffin and Andrew Humphreys their first commands on brigade level.
   
   He should never have led it out to fight himself, though, his beloved Army of the Potomac. He was distinctly unqualified for that. I think that deep down inside of him, he was aware of this, read his correspondance (also compiled in a magnificent book by Stephen Sears, buy it!!!): his letters offer a case-study of a man plagued by insecurities, complexes and paranoia.
   
   mr. Sears comes down hard on McClellan, very hard. But the points he argues are correct: McClellan was singularly unfit to lead an army.
   Yet he was so boastful and arrogant that he put himself first and the Union war effort second, as is witnessed by his behaviour during the interlude in august 1862, when Major General John Pope commanded half of MacClellan's army aginst Lee. McClellan preferred to let Pope (who possessed as annoying a personality and as large an ego as McClellan) be beaten by Lee than come to his aid.
   
   By then Lincoln was don with him: he let McClellan lead the army for the Antietam campaign, in order to drive Lee from Mary land, but when McClellan again started whining and dragging his feet he fired him.
   "Alas, my poor country"McClellan wrote his wife after his removal from command. Alas indeed: the war was to last another two and a half years, while he could have ended it in one day, had he not so utterly mismanaged the battle of Antietam.
   That is McClellan's enduring bequest to his country: two and a half more years of war.
   
   What baffles me is this: why wasn't he brought to account for this in his own time??? Instead he was honoured, admired and even nominated for the Presidency in 1864!!!
   McClellan lost the 1864 election to Lincoln, thank God. Had he won the world would not have been the same: maybe America would still be split in two countries: the USA and the CSA, or the Civil War would have restarted and be contested with even more bitterness and more ruinous consequences for the nations after his presidential term, or even terms.
   Why he was not impeached, tried or court-martialled after his inept campaign in september and october 1862 is a question I ask myself. Surely others must have too?
   
   Lincoln should have made McClellan Quartermaster-General in Chief of the Union army and put him in charge of supply, armament, recruitment, equipment and training. That was what he was good at. He would have been the Union's Lazare Carnot: "the Organizer of Victory" of the French Revolution. There is litle doubt in my mind he would have done a very good job.
   
   A solid biography on this remarkable man. Well done Stephen W. Sears!!! Keep 'em coming.



5. I'd like to knock some sense into this little brat General.
   
   Lee rules Dixie! Long Live the South.