1 comments about Quantrill in Texas: The Forgotten Campaign.

1. Quantrill in Texas is half the size of Paul R. Petersen's excellent primary work -- 'Quantrill of Missouri: The Making of a Guerilla Warrior', q.v. It contains redundant material at the beginning (i.e., to the first book), a hodge-podge of disorganised author's note card material in the middle, and an end which does remind the reader that Paul R. Peterson, a native of Quantrill's geographic domain, really can write superbly on William Clarke Quantrill. But why, with all the other redundant material, the author omits Col. Quantrill's tender care by the Sisters of Charity and two priests, and conversion to the Church of Rome, puzzles one; it is one more substantiation of the high esteem which the Catholic Church held for the South and the vital hospital work which they did internationally for countless soldiers without regard to politics. (The high regard which the South held for her Catholic, as also Hebrew, citizens is once again demonstrated, and evident the more one reads the primary sources, like the journals of hospital matrons Kate Cumming and Phoebe Levy Yates Pember, and of Kate Stone and other Southern ladies.)
   
   Hopefully the author will eventually redact the primary work to include this supplemental material and any other which he may have discovered in the interim. For the Quantrill, par excellence, his primary work, '... Missouri', is not only a treasure trove of material, it is the labour-of-love of a superbly capable writer. The photographs & maps included in the Texas book, however, also are of value. I cannot recommend [his other work] 'Quantrill of Missouri' too highly, how-be-it; it is a genuine 5-star work, unlike its successor here -- extremely well researched, organised, and authored.
   
   Those who are hoping in a Quantrill trilogy of the first order, as another reviewer intimated, will be disappointed in the second instllment. Rather than a trilogy, I would respectfully urge Mr Petersen to consolidate all the new material, and this present work, into a primary, master, stand-alone 'Quantrill of Missouri'. Mr Petersen is a military man, a marine trained in guerrilla warfare, whose insights into battle technique are never-the-less be of some added value in his Texas book -- thus rating an extra star. Whatever you do, won't you first make sure you have 'Quantrill of Missouri' -- and then consider adding this second, 'Texas', Quantrill, for what it may be worth?

3 comments about The Monitor Chronicles : One Sailor's Account. Today's Campaign to Recover the Civil War Wreck.

1. The biggest disapointment is that Greer does not write about the most interesting parts of the Monitor's history: the trip down to Hampton roads and the battle with the Virginia. It is about his shipboard life which details his illnesses and money making schemes to augment his pay which was not paid out to him in full causing financial hardship at home. Mostly of interest for its insights into a sailor's life, less so for info on the Monitor. It's a decent book to supplement other info on the Monitor but not the book to get if you get only one.



2. The Mariner's Museum has done a commendable job in putting together such an attractive collection of letters from Monitor sailor George Geer to his wife. Through his eyes, we see a more human perspective on the Civil War and the famous battle between the Monitor and the C.S.S. Virginia than is available through most other sources. However, at times this perspective is altogether too human, as Geer devotes page after page of his letters to more mundane esoterica such as selling merchandise to his fellow crew members. The Mariner's Museum also used the needlessly repetitive and districting format style of putting some of the very same passages from Geer's letters in text, in bold, oversize text, and/or in actual illustrations of Geer's letters -- as a result, the reader constantly finds himself/herself reading duplicate passages. I also felt a little short-changed by the brevity of the discussion on the current state of the Monitor wreck and the plans for its future recovery and conservation. A few more illustrations of the wreck itself, and a few less of Geer's letters, would have been welcome. Other than these quibbles, it was a very enjoyable and informative look at a revolutionary ship through the eyes of someone who was there when history was made at Hampton Roads.



3. An interesting information source for life aboard the Monitor. There aren't alot of books out there about the ship, and I think this book was very interesting and needed. Also George Geer's actual letters are very interesting to read, as he tells everything that happened aboard the ship.

1 comments about A Philadelphia Perspective: The Civil War Diary of Sidney George Fisher (North's Civil War).

1. I have been reading Civil War history as an amateur since I went with my father to the battle reenactments of southern and western Virginia. While the historically accurate yet still fictional accounts contained in the famous novels have somewhat more poignant stories (as anything with the crutch of hindsight inevitably will), The Diary will stand alone for me as THE true reflection of the Civil War North. While many stories may at first glance seem irrelevant, the mood betrayed by the dinner parties, social events, and street-corner conversations could not possibly feel more real. Clearly the Editor of this book (I forgot his name, and lent my copy to a friend) has a mind like a razor. While he clearly spends much of his time immersed in the annals of history, he also has the ability to cut through the confusing language and often mispelled words, directly to the heart of the matter. I would recommend this book to anyone who wants insight into the minds of our forefathers. Well Done!

5 comments about George B. McClellan and Civil War History: In the Shadow of Grant and Sherman.

1. I am in two minds about this book. On the one hand: history has not been kind to "Little Mac", and it was about time somebody stood up for McClellan. Mr. Rowland has picked up the gauntlet. Lately, it seems to me, one can detect a bit of a trend towards that end. Mr. Rowland and other authors have reexamined and reassessed the General's personality and actions. Mr. Ethan S. Rafuse's book on McClellan ("McClellan's War") is another example of a fresh look at McClellan.
   To do so and fly in the face of the "communis opinio" (the widely held view) of McClellan is in itself commendable.
   
   On the other hand: I don't think that there is much purpose to this excercise. As I see it, and I'm pretty sure in that many other ACW scholars, buffs and aficionados, share this point of view, no matter how fresh or objective one tries to look at George Brinton McClellan, one reaches the same conclusions again and again: that the General was a deeply flawed man, to say the least, vain and boastful, and yet (or perhaps even because of this) also extremely cautious, highly insecure and frankly, paranoid. I've read of people, in his own time already, not just smart-mouth Amazon book-reviewers like yours truly, referring to him as a crackpot. I even think it was Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton. Well, we know that Secretary Stanton was no great friend of McClellan and that he was quite stern in his opinions about the Generals he had to deal with, but in this case his ususally hot-headed judgement is not necessarily a wrong one.
   
   Is it time for some revisionist history concerning McClellan? Is this necessary? Are the commonly held views of McClellan subject to debate, are these views thought to be untrue, unjust, unfair or even unhistorical by a growing number of ACW scholars, students and buffs? No, of course they are not. Because the general view of McClellan is born out of something "Little Mac" himself so conspicuously lacked: common sense.
   
   Major General George Brinton McClellan had it all when he was called to Washington in 1861. He had a towering reputation (which was undeserved, after his successfull but minor campaign in Western Virginia, but the Union was elated to have a military success at last), he was hailed as the savior of the Union and he was given command of the Union's most important field army. The President and the cabinet trusted him, deferred to his judgement and put themselves at his disposition in stead of the other way round. He soon succeeded in ousting Winfield Scott, the venerable US Army Chief, and became General in Chief of all Union armies. McClellan, catapulted into this position of enormous power, then started to believe the adulation and the flattery of the people, the press and the politicians himself. He seemed to need it more and more, because as his influence and power increased, so did his insecurities, his doubts, his paranoia and his unbalance.
   Well, we don't need to make to much of McClellan's flaws, after all, who of is isn't flawed in some, or even many, ways. Mr. Rowland correctly makes that point. McClellan wasn't more or less flawed than Grant and or Sherman. The thing is, however, that Grant and Sherman overcame their flaws, faced their demons and learned to function adequately if not superbly in command.
   McClellan did not succeed in ridding himself of his fears or in learning to control them, nor in curbing his insecurities and his paranoid tendencies, and as such he was definitely not the right man to command the Army of the Potomac in the field.
   
   Also there is cause to question his moral and indeed even his physical courage: McClellan stayed well away from the field of fight during any action. And there are more instances of behavior which justify this question mark against "Little Mac"'s honor of than the often cited episode of McClellan sailing away on a gunboat just after the beginning of the battle of Malvern Hill. An "unforgivable act of pusillanimity", as was said by some at the time, for which McClellan never offered an adequate explanation. Well, surely he was not prepared to get down to the level of his accusers and react to such slander, mr Rowland says. Yeah, right. That is the way in which people like McClellan usually respond to such considerations. I think, as do many others, that there remains a reasonable doubt as to McClellan's courage, based on his actions.
   
   As to his judgment, well, let's name an aspect of this that puts a different light on the General's fitness for command. I'm talking of course of McClellan's tendency to systematically overestimate the number of enemy troops opposing him. He did this from day one in command and kept it up to right after Antietam, when he was finally relieved, in october 1862.
   
   Why oh why did he do this? How did he come by those incredibly fantastic figures of hundreds of thousands of rebels opposing him and his poor little army? Was it all Pinkerton's fault? The great detective, after all, supplied the figures to McClellan. Pinkerton later said that he and his operatives had always given McClellan true numbers to the best of their knowledge. He also stated that they had not supplied McClellan with data which would support the exaggerated numbers of troops McClellan claimed Johnston and after him Lee had arrayed against him. In other words: McClellan took what Pinkerton gave him and then did some calculating of his own. He tailored the facts to fit his opinions and impressions, a professional hazard for a General, made all the more probable by McClellan's psychological make-up.
   Whatever the psychological reasons; his inability to admit mistakes is one of the least attractive traits of McClellan's character.
   After the war, indeed even during it, it became clear that Johnston and Lee had never commanded anything near the numbers of men that McClellan had claimed in his frantic cries for reinforcements and on which he had based his overcautious strategies.
   After doing some maths it must have dawned on the people of the North that the war, which had gone on for four bloody years, could have ended in 1862. It could have ended with McClellan taking Richmond in june 1862 or with McClellan crushing Lee's badly outnumbered army at Antietam. In those days McClellan had acted too cautiously because he had convinced himself he was outnumbered. Even McClellan must have known, pretty soon after the war, that he had been tricked, by the rebels and by his own mind. But he never made any comment on the question!
   He never apologized (well, that would have been impossible for a man like him) but neither did he ever explain his behavior. He never said on what he had he had based his now manifestly wrong actions in the Peninsula and Antietam campaigns!
   
   What I even less understand, why weren't the people of the Union states furious with him for failing to win the war in 1862? He dawdled, faltered and failed and in doing so wasted the opportunities to end the war out of weakness, lack of resolve, moral cowardice and pig-headedness! He had Lee's battleplans in his possession just prior to Antietam, for Pete's sakes!! Why wasn't there more of an outcry against him? The war lasted two more years thanks to him! Why was he not dragged before congress or before a court-martial? In my view there was every reason to do so.
   
   Now to the plus side. McClellan made the Army of the Potomac. He built it from the masses of raw volunteers that came to Washington in 1861. He trained these men, and selected their commanders, and he made some inspired choices in this regard (men like Gibbon, Hancock, and Hunt, for instance). He drilled the army, organized it and fed, clothed and housed it. He kept the army in good health an kept it supplied.
   The fine performance of the men of the Army of the Potomac, especially that of the infantry and the gunners, owed a very great deal to the rigourous training programme to which McClellan subjected them. The General turned out to possess an enormous talent for organization and training. He honed the skills of the army and prepared it to an excellent degree for it's task. The credit for this is largely due to McClellan. Maybe this was part of the problem: McClellan built the army and knew it's strengths and it's weaknesses. After having made this huge army he was reluctant to commit it to action. They were all so green! There were so few regulars! He could not do what the French had done in 1793 when they fused the professional Royal Army with the new volunteer army, made up of inexperienced national guardsmen. They amalgamated the two types of soldiers in a new army: they put one regular army batallion in a demi-brigade with two batallions of volunteers. In this way the old sweats showed the rookies the ropes of soldiering and infused old-fashioned discipline while in turn the volunteers were an example and an inspiration of revolutionary elan to the old soldiers.
   McClellan could not do this: there were only some 17.000 regular soldiers in the US Army in 1861. He felt he had to use his army very very carefully and cautiously, if he lost it, he would lose the war, and the Union with it. This realization, of which he convinced himself, eventually paralyzed him.
   
   This is book that makes you think, and think again, on McClellan. Four stars for that!!!
   I do not share Mr. Rowland's conclusions, though. In 1862 McClellan was not the best man for the job to command the Army of the Potomac.
   It would have been for him and for his reputation had he continued in an organizing/facilitating capacity. Lincoln should have made him Chief of Staff in Washington, in fact, should have given "Little Mac" the job Henry Halleck got in 1862, or should have made him Quartermaster-General or even Secretary of War.
   It would in all probability have meant that McClellan would have become the Lazare Carnot of the Union: "The Organizer of Victory" The man who supplied the tools that won the war for the Union. He could then have supervised the productions of arms and ammunition, the supplying of the army, it's transportation, the training of it's new recruits, and he would more than probably have done a great job. He was the born military organizer. He was not, alas, a great field commander. McClellan would have lived to great respect and glory and would not have died at 58, of a heart condition which probably stemmed from the stress of supreme command, and which after the war was aggravated by the constant stress of battling to keep his reputation intact. McClellan died a controversial figure, respected and yet partly tragic, partly ridiculous. But he had only himself to blame for this.



2. As an Amazon.com reviewer, I can see that I am going to be in the decided minority in my opinion on this book. Hopefully I can adequately point out my perceived problems with Mr. Rowland's work, and yet maintain the positives other reviewers have posted.

   I have long been fascinated with George B. McClellan as not only a Civil War general, but as a Civil War personality as well. Here we have a man who should have been the one, single, Union military success - a man who had it all: brains, looks, youth, education, and family. And yet, there is no single Union general who managed to accomplish so little in over a year's time, with so much.

   I hoped that Thomas J. Rowland's "George B. McClellan & Civil War History: In the Shadow of Grant and Sherman" would provide some insight into McClellan's flawed character that did not come forth from modern biographers such as Stephen Sears. Yet within Rowland's work, I was sorely disappointed.

   Rowland sets forth to disprove Little Mac's critics by doing the one thing in Civil War writing that I abhor - rather than building up his subject, and letting McClellan's story stand on its own - he sets out to drag everyone else down. For some strange reason, there appears to be more and more of this going on in Civil War historiography of late, much to the detriment of our understanding of history.

   Rowland sets out to outline the perceived problems with McClellan's personality and generalship, and rather than refute the contentions directly, often sets out to discredit others such as Grant, Sherman, and Edwin Stanton. If Rowland's guy cannot stand tall, then no one else will, as well. For example, we have on page 67 a typical statement of Rowland's: "The notion that McClellan was the butt of more embarrassing incidents than anyone else is greatly diminished by any extended review of the war's comical and tragic mistakes." And from there, rather than review Little Mac, Rowland sets out to review other participants on history's stage.

   Rowland attempts to minimize McClellan's flaws by qualifying his admittance of such flaws throughout the book. Thus, we see Rowland admit, cautiously, that McClellan could be petty, vain, and vindictive "on occasion." In other places, his review of other historian's work is tinged with statements like "Unfortunately, that is not entirely true." The reader is left to try to ponder which portions are partially true, and partially not.

   This book is not a comprehensive analysis of the life and times of General George B. McClellan, but a selected bibliography of truth and half-truth that uses only what the author wants the public to see about McClellan - and more importantly, anyone else held in higher esteem than the Young Napoleon that can be drawn down to the perceived level that history holds McClellan.

   All in all, this was a very disappointing work. If you want to come to grips with the enigma that was McClellan, this book will leave you very short of your expectations.




3. The author, Thomas J. Rowland, develops his thesis that General George McClellan has been unfairly characterized by both contemporaries and historians. The first half of the book discusses the common criticisms of McClellan. In Chapter 2 the so called psychological profile on McClellan is reviewed stating that "Of all the reasons why McClellan may have been a gravely flawed commander, the exploitation of the psychological model is the most flawed itself...." He notes that both Grant and Sherman "....trailed a significant baggage of personality deficiencies into the Civil War" observing that "If anyone came close to experiencing a psychic episode during the Civil War it was Sherman in Kentucky."

   In the chapter discussing McClellan's lesser faults, the author notes that both Grant and Sherman had similar faults, but they weren't judged by these faults nor should McClellan's strategic abilities be evaluated by his peccadilloes. Acknowledging that McClellan played a major role in his poor working relations with Lincoln, the author notes that "....the president was not frank about how military goals were to be shaped by the political dimensions of the rebellion." In addition, Stanton's dislike of McClellan did not help in the commander's poor relationship with the president. However, the author does not imply that McClellan was faultless noting "....his failure to delegate authority and his obstinate secrecy" Another fault was his unwillingness to take risks. The greatest question is whether he made the best use of the Army of the Potomac. Rowland concludes that "In any comparison with other Civil War commanders, particularly those to whom he is unfavorably compared, McClellan's personal shortcomings were not that remarkable."

   Chapter 4's discussion of the early months of war provides valuable insight into the ultimate conduct of the war. The widely held Northern belief that most Southerners were not committed secessionists initially led to a limited war strategy. After the First Manassas McClellan recommended that to restore the Union in the shortest time, the North had to "crust the rebellion at one blow...." Rowland notes "McClellan's was....a well reasoned strategic proposal. His conservative views.... reflected....widespread appeal throughout the North at that time...." In support of this strategy, he launched the Peninsula Campaign which was undermined by Washington politics and lack of support. The book states

   "....the half defeat on the Peninsula.... spelled the end of the conciliatory" strategy. For this campaign to succeed, joint operations were mandatory; and the author observes that in the early stages of the war, the inability of Federal armies to cooperate in joint operations contrasted sharply with the military situation Grant inherited in 1864.

   The review of civilian leaders alarm regarding Washington's safety is noteworthy. Extraordinary concerns for the capital's safety contrasted with months of endless nagging McClellan to assume the offensive. However the troops needed for an offensive had to come from those providing the capital's defense. Both McClellan and Grant faced the problem of Washington's safety with McClellan trying to comply and Grant often giving only limited support. The book concludes "McClellan's Peninsula campaign, the first major Federal offensive in East, experienced problems uniquely its own, not the least....was the administration's failure to sustain plans they had.... agreed to support." During the first two war years, many Northerners believed the Confederates would be quickly defeated perhaps in one major campaign. When McClellan assumed command in 1861, he inherited an untrained and disorganized army. The author notes that McClellan implemented schools of instruction and all volunteers were given basic training directed by an experienced officer. In addition, he recognized the deficit in trained officers (several were political hacks) and arranged effective training. The book frequently notes, that the training and organizing of the army was a major contribution. Considering, the sheer folly of his predecessor's taking an unprepared army to defeat at the First Bull Run, McClellan's unwillingness to assume the offensive in 1861 with an untrained army was prudent and not excessive caution. Unfortunately, in 1862, politics and lack of support doomed his Peninsula campaign.

   Rowland writes "....little attention is paid to the context in which McClellan dealt with the difficulties that faced the Federal army in the first fifteen months of the war. ....his early tenure deprived him of the advantage of leading mature and seasoned civilian soldiers, adapted to the demands of a new age of warfare...." As one historian noted, McClellan "suffered the frictions and frustrations of being first." The text notes that Sherman observed that Napoleon took three years to build an army and "....here it is expected in ninety days..." The author notes the irony that McClellan was relieved of command when "He had effectively divided Lee's army into widely separated halves, intending to drive between them. The celerity of those moves alarmed Lee...." This could have been a critical blow.

   The text continues that McClellan might have been forgiven a multiple of failures had he kept his eye on the military objective, the destruction of the Army of Northern Virginia. However, McClellan's strategy to capture Richmond was not without merit as Richmond was a critical manufacturing, transportation and financial center. The Tredegar Iron Works alone justified the capture of Richmond. Richmond's fall during the first two war years would have been devastating to the Confederacy. Regarding Antietam, Rowland correctly notes that regardless of McClellan's shortcomings, Antietam was a Union victory. McClellan had stopped Lee from delivering a demoralizing blow on northern soil.

   The book concludes, "McClellan's strategy, though reflective of the unrealistic war aims of the years 1861-62,was cogent, reasoned, and consistent with conventional military wisdom.... McClellan can scarcely be elevated to the ranks of the great captains of war, but he was hardly the worst that the conflict dragged into the center stage."

   The book is somewhat repetitious and devotes too much space to comparing McClellan's faults with similar faults of Grant and Sherman. However, the book is worth reading for its discussion of Union military and political strategy during the first two years of the Civil War.




4. Thomas J. Rowland set out to prove that, although George McClellan was not a great general, neither was he as bad as so many Civil War historians and writers have depicted him. I believe that he has succeeded. Having read Stephen Sears' classic biography on "Mac", I was certain that the definitive McClellan verdict was a fait accompli. How wrong I was! Historians T. Harry Williams, Kenneth P. Williams, and Bruce Catton were also cited for a less than even-handed assessment of McClellan. Still, one must add that Rowland did not maliciously criticize the intent of these historians. He merely pointed out that they needlessly made Lincoln, Grant, and Sherman--men who remain giants without anyone's help--larger than they should be, at McClellan's expense. After examining their records during the first two years of the war, each of these men showed less than a superlative level of performance, contrary to popular assumption. I think that Rowland's book is one of best buys I have ever made. A more superbly-written, well-argued, and illuminating book on George McClellan and his impact on the Civil War and its interpretation would be hard to find. It's great. Buy it!



5. Thomas J. Rowland set out to prove that, although George McClellan was not a great general, neither was he as bad as so many Civil War historians and writers have depicted him. I believe that he has succeeded. Having read Stephen Sears' classic biography on "Mac", I was certain that the definitive McClellan verdict was a fait accompli. How wrong I was! Historians T. Harry Williams, Kenneth P. Williams, and Bruce Catton were also cited for a less than even-handed assessment of McClellan. Still, one must add that Rowland did not maliciously criticize the intent of these historians. He merely pointed out that they needlessly made Lincoln, Grant, and Sherman--men who remain giants without anyone's help--larger than they should be, at McClellan's expense. After examining their records during the first two years of the war, each of these men showed less than a superlative level of performance, contrary to popular assumption. I think that Rowland's book is one of best buys I have ever made. A more superbly-written, well-argued, and illuminating book on George McClellan and his impact on the Civil War and its interpretation would be hard to find. It's great. Buy it!

1 comments about From Conciliation to Conquest: The Sack of Athens and the Court-Martial of Colonel John B. Turchin.

1. I highly recommend this book for the serious student of Civil War history. The text is thought provoking and insightful. It is a timely work when viewed from a modern perspective of today's U.S. volunteer military force in the wake of the invasion and occupation of Iraq. In this context, it is easy to recognize parallels between the attitudes and beliefs of the Union volunteers who perceived themselves initially as liberators and later as occupiers. One can also sense similarities in shifts of official policy and in the roll of the press in shaping public opinion. Simply stated, this text is relevant to the events of today. The book presents a penetrating study of the evolution of official Union policy toward civil populations in occupied areas from Lincoln's first inaugural to the decided policy shift in the Shenandoah Valley adopted by John Pope in 1862.
   
   The text is presented in an easy to read well-organized format and follows the intriguing military career of the immigrant, John Turchin, formerly a colonel in the Imperial Russian Army. Turchin comes to life as a colorful character, schooled in the Russian military academies and a veteran of the Czar's occupation of Hungary after the Revolutions of 1848. Later, settling in Chicago, he is drawn early into the conflict as an experienced professional soldier. As a Union officer, he is portrayed as a courageous leader whose dedication to his regiment's welfare demands the loyalty of his men.
   In articulating the details of Turchin's career as a Union officer, the authors lead you through a major policy shift in Lincoln's administration. Turchin's trial and the events preceding it are used to explore the changes in emotions and attitudes of the Union toward the southern secessionists. This is a skilled narration, very different from many Civil War histories. It explores the war from an unusual viewpoint, studying a topic that has received little attention by other scholars. The format of the book makes for an enjoyable easy read.

2 comments about The Lincoln Mailbag: America Writes to the President, 1861-1865.

1. This book, a sequel of sorts to Mr. Holzer's 1993 volume 'Dear Mr. Lincoln,' gathers together even more letters than Americans from all walks of life wrote to the President. Mr. Holzer is a Civil War and Lincoln expert, so he really knows his stuff. As he explains in the foreword, many of the letters he had decided for various reasons to leave out of the original volume are now included here. What makes this collection of letters so special is that many of them were never even seen by President Lincoln, and of the ones seen, many of them were never endorsed or answered. It was for that reason that Mr. Holzer originally thought such letters didn't merit being included, but then he realised the value of including them, particularly since many of them were written by African-Americans. They'd already been ignored once, and didn't deserve to be marginalised and written off again nearly 150 years later for the same reasons they'd been excluded before.
   
   People wrote to President Lincoln because they felt that he was a man of the people and would therefore understand their hopes, dreams, worries, and fears. He didn't appear to them like some out of touch government bigwig who didn't care for the common people; due to his humble origins, they felt as though he were one of them. The subjects include the issue of equal pay for African-American soldiers, old widowed mothers wanting their sons, their sole source of support, back from the Army, a Harvard professor warning him that his oldest son Robert was doing pretty poorly at school, people writing to him about their warfare-related inventions, people (a number of them his relatives) wanting jobs in government (even local government), people who sent gifts (such as socks, scarves, gloves, hams, and flags), people requesting he appear or at least send a speech to their charity balls, congratulations on his re-election, warnings of assassination plots (such as the letter from the less-than-literate West Virginia man who hid inside of a wheat bin to eavesdrop on a conversation between some suspicious characters he worked with), and a man who wanted to start a Lincoln Club (but only on the precondition that the President rescind the Emancipation Proclamation!). Among my favorites were the letter written by Karl Marx (and signed by many of his colleagues) congratulating him on his re-election and lauding him for being such a friend of the common people and freeing the slaves, and the long threatening religious diatribe in verse (so long it was written by two different people) sent all of the way from New Zealand.
   
   Though most people are traditionally used to studying history through the eyes of the ruling classes and the leaders of government, the people who supposedly make history, this book gives a valuable look into what life was like for ordinary American citizens during the Civil War. In many cases, the view of history provided through the eyes of the common people is even more interesting, and far more personal, than studying the exploits of a bunch of heads of state.



2. I had bought Harold Holzer's 1993 book "Dear Mr. President" and enjoyed it tremendously. That book dealt with the mail that ordinary and famous people from around the world sent to Abraham Lincoln during his term as U.S. President. Now, Holzer has produced a sequel book, "The Lincoln Mailbag", which contains even more letters written to Lincoln. A large number in this new volume consists of mail Lincoln never even saw, such as correspondence from black Americans. These two books by Holzer offer a fresh, new insight into the world of President Lincoln which is far more interesting than the ordinary, standard Lincoln biographies which seem to pop up every 6 months or so.

4 comments about Death of a Legend: The Myth and Mystery Surrounding the Death of Davy Crockett.

1. When I saw this book on the shelf, I was really hoping to read an objective analysis of this topic. I had read several earlier books by other authors about the battle for the Alamo, and was aware of the de la Pena account, and thought this book would be the true scholarly discourse on the topic I wanted. What a disappointment! It quickly became clear while reading that scholarship was absent. Scholars don't write works like this in first person, or flip-flopping between 1st and 3rd. Even more however, the author states upfront a personal scepticism about the de la Pena account before ever discussing it, and makes it clear this book is motivated by criticism he received on an earlier book on the same topic. When he finally gets to the de la Pena account, his arguments appear more to be opinion, and does he want scientific testing of the document, no, that wouldn't prove anything to him! How about present the facts and let the reader decide? Throughout the book, at every opportunity he poos all over the de la Pena account without ever giving the reader the information/analysis to decide for themselves. The sad thing about this is that I still haven't seen an objective scholarly treatment of this topic and I need to keep on looking.



2. The argument goes on and on..

   But it is bewildering how some authors will find any means possible to support their hero worship sentiments. The question I ask is why are Mexican eyewitness accounts scrutinized and summarily dismissed if they counter legend? And why are some Mexican accounts acceptable when they support legend? Why does the author accept questionable Anglo accounts (Dickinson) yet fail to question her credibility in light of some confused observations (her sighting of Travis body on the chapel roof)?

   The author,I guess, believes students of the Alamo will believe what they want to believe...and accept the verification of that belief that best fits their views. In my opinion, those who want to maintain the The Legend Must Live! view of the siege and fall of the Alamo have an ally with this author.




3. I try and read everything that comes out of the Alamo and the Texas Revolution. This author is beginning to make "a living" off the argument that the de la Pena diary is a fake, but in the end he can offer absolutely no evidence is the contrary from what we already know before the work is read! Did Crockett die in battle? Groneman says no one knows. But was Crockett taken prisoner and then executed? Groneman does not know, but believes that the de la Pena diary on which much of, but not all, that tale is founded, is a fake. So by the time the reader gets to the end of the work, there is nothing conclusive. So, the question that begs to be asked is: what's the point? Crockett was at the Alamo. Crockett fought. Crockett died. What difference does it make HOW he died? The entire exercise is analogous to the question of whether or not Napoleon was murdered on Saint Helena? Who cares? It does not change what Napoleon did in life any more than how Crockett met his end changes what he stood for by choosing to fight and die at the Alamo. My suggestion to Mr Groneman is for him to please move on.



4. This book's focus and raison d'etre - the death of Crockett - is "...the opportunity to present the history and evolution of our beliefs regarding this one brief moment in history...to look at the question from beginning to end." The author's own remarks here encapsulate the book's intent, with "beliefs" the most telling word.

   In their writings, authors reveal more about their own work and about themselves than any review can. It often escapes our attention that reviewers offer their own opinions (welcome to Oz!) which many, for better or worse, will ultimately share. The most any prudent reviewer can do is say if - and why - a book is worth reading. Too many reviewers tend to view a book tangentially and focus on what it is not. This reviewer regards an author's work for what it is and gauges it on its own merits. That's my modus operandi.

   Bill Groneman gives us a solid work. That's his modus operandi. Western historians will have to live a long time, amass abundant research material, study it diligently, and learn a great deal from it before realizing they'd be hard pressed to nullify this book's substance and findings. Even with the most convincing arguments unanswered questions remain - but behind argument stands evidence. If we're persuaded, it's not by the author's comments but more importantly by his actual findings. That he so acknowledges this in his book is very much to his credit: he has enough confidence in some of his readers' intellect to feel they can come to their own conclusions and he wants us to think for ourselves.

   There's evidence Crockett died in battle and several accounts place his remains near the front of the Chapel. No book will ever hold the last word on the matter (but this one holds the most recent one), and the evidence Groneman presents here is certainly persuasive. It's a given that many believe Crockett died battling because they wish to, and because other less heroic possibilities go against their grain; revisionists may believe otherwise, but for corresponding reasons. Even if only by common sense, it seems unlikely Crockett would have met his end another way, including (as some revisionists claim) by surrendering or hiding - particularly when we consider personal self-sufficiency not only as one of the concepts but as one of the operative characteristics of those who lived in that era and particularly in that area. It appears submission or cowardice would be, in the most basic and understated term, rather inconsistent with someone who had been variously a farmer, hunter, veteran of the Creek Indian War, militia colonel, Tennessee state legislator, and three-term U.S. congressman. The rational person concludes that Crockett's conduct throughout his too-short life speaks for itself.

   The only objection the judicious reader should make is that this book isn't long enough. You can't choke a cat with cream. Even at nearly 200 pages of actual text, with additional pages of subsequent sections (including one titled Conclusions which offers incredibly perceptive possibilities), significant contributions by Joseph Musso and well-executed original drawings by artist Rod Timanus, we'd welcome more. Some of Groneman's turns-of-phrase encapsulate the discord between opposing factions; about one academic, his insightful observation "...the quintessential professor straightening out the errant student" warrants nomination for inclusion in future editions of Bartlett's Familiar Quotations by its masterfully deriding contextual explanation.

   The only objection this reviewer has to the book's layout is that the footnotes appear at the end of the volume itself, but it's reasonable to presume these footnote placement logistics originated with the publisher, not the author. Footnotes so rendered are if not equivalent then certainly comparable to hearing knocks at the door on one's wedding night.

   JEFFREY DANE

No comments about Soldier Princess: The Life and Legend of Agnes Salm-Salm in North America, 1861-1867.

5 comments about All on Fire: William Lloyd Garrison and the Abolition of Slavery.

1. Bad
   
   A. The narrative pace is just awful. I don't know what it is about this book I almost didn't make it past the first 40 pages because the begining moves so slowly.
   B. The idiotic "conspiracy theory" idea regarding the Texas Revolution. Someday right minded people everywhere will be able to laugh conspiracy nuts right off the street.
   Good
   
   The book has a great deal of information regarding the beginnings of an organized abolitionist movement in this country. Garrison was the focal point for this when the movement started to move beyond isolated groups of idealists and Quakers and started to be taken seriously as a genuine force for social change.
   
   Overall-Once you get into the book it is amazing, but you have to be in the right mood to do so.



2. Now a book that shows two sides of slavery that all white people were not all for slavery .Like Dr.martin luther king was saying that slavery was not about black against white ,but justice againt injustice.Because if all men and women are not free then we are all in chains.Books like this one has giving us a balance look at one of america darkest sides. But men like Garrison showed us that their were men and women that were a light of hope that all men are created equal . And being a black man I must say thank you to all the blackmen and women and white men and women of the past for fighting a fight that many of us still fight for today .And that is for an opportunity to live as we were when God created us in the beginnig as, a human being thank you.



3. William Lloyd Garrison was a man ahead of his time. Not by years or even decades, but centuries. In the 1830s he was an outspoken proponent of not just the abolition of slavery (many advocated various ways to deal with the South's "peculiar institution"), but called for the immediate abolition of slavery with complete and full civil rights for African-Americans. He dreamed of a time when a black woman might succeed a black man as Secretary of State a decade before the Supreme Court ruled that blacks were something less than human in the infamous Dredd Scott decision. He was also an early advocate of women's rights, labor reform, temperance and civil disobedience, as well as an outspoken critic of organized religion (Garrison was what we might today call a fundamentalist "born again Christian" who recognized no formal church other than Christ's teachings).
   
   Given Garrison's role as founding father of the abolitionist movement, his passion for the cause, longevity in leadership and terminal impact on the greatest political issue of the nineteenth century it is puzzling that he has left such an obscure historical legacy. As author Herbert Mayer notes, Martin Luther King Jr. cited Gandhi, Thoreau and the Gospel as his inspiration and motivation in the Civil Rights movement with no reference to the man whose peaceful agitation did more to eradicate bondage than any other -- and who in turn may very well have been Thoreau's inspiration in writing "Civil Disobedience."
   
   So why the obscurity? Mayer's biography does little to address this paradox. In fact, his book makes Garrison's general absence from the mainstream of American history all the more tenebrous. The man that emerges from the pages of "All on Fire" is a moral giant, a crusader in the purest and best sense of the word, who risked -- indeed, welcomed -- verbal and physical abuse, a life of indigence and scorn, all in pursuit of a truly noble cause. Garrison grew up in New England and never traveled further south than Baltimore until after the Civil War, yet he dedicated his life to the abolition of slavery with an intensity and zeal that surpassed dissident southern whites (such as the Grimke sisters) and even some blacks that had escaped from bondage themselves. Because of his central role in establishing and leading the cause, "All on Fire" is, as the full title suggests, as much a history of the entire abolitionist movement as it is a biography of its leading agitator.
   
   However, a close reading of "All on Fire" also reveals a hidden side of William Lloyd Garrison that Mayer, unfortunately, never fully explores: a man of extreme ambition, vanity, and conceit. Garrison fought tenaciously to keep himself at the front-and-center of the moral movement he came to regard as his own. One senses that the fame and notoriety he gained by his agitation came to mean quite a lot to him. In this sense, Garrison reminds one of a contemporary political gadfly increasingly enamored of his high-profile image: Michael Moore. Perhaps Garrison's attraction to celebrity never fully outweighed his commitment to the ultimate prize of freeing three million humans from bondage, but it certainly meant more than the pious Christian in him would have liked to admit -- and certainly more than biographer Mayer is willing to concede. Again and again throughout the narrative Garrison experiences a painful and personal falling out with some of his closest friends and coadjutors: Frederick Douglas, Wendell Phillips, the Tappan brothers, etc. And time after time Mayer attributes the rift to simple misunderstandings or the result of the stress and pressure of the times. That Garrison might have been something less than the Galahad on ante-bellum America is left unexplored.
   
   Nevertheless, for anyone with a desire to know more about America and especially to learn about a man that was once one of the most controversial and well-known figures of his century, only to sink to near anonymity, this National Book Award finalist can be highly recommended.



4. Let's just get the obvious criticisms out of they way. First, the author pretty much flat out states that The Civil War was fought only because of slavery--and in the preface! Yawn. Will I ever be able to find a Northerner who can write a book that examines both sides of the conflict? I mean southern writers do it all the time. The second problem is the assertion that the Texas Revolution was some kind of government conspiracy--from Pres. Jackson on down to Sam Houston--to perpetuate slavery and continue manifest destiny. While I'm sure some men fought for those reasons, this moronic conspiracy theory about secret government shenanigans has no basis whatsoever. In fact, I would recommend the wonderful biography, Sam Houston, by James Haley. It expertly destroys that awful line of thinking that has somehow survived all these years.
   
   But, being from Texas, I tend to be sensitive to such things. For most people it won't matter.
   
   I still highley recommend All On Fire, though. It is very well written and researched. But most of all, it is the only real biography on Garrison worth reading. And say what you want about the author's biases, he can't muddle the fact that Garrison was one of this country's great patriots, willing to stand up to anyone to free his fellow man. He dedicated his entire life to this noble cause--and except for a few references in some Civil War books--is largely forgotten. What a shame.



5. This is the last and probably the best book completed by the late Henry Mayer.

   Mayer admired Garrison, the most important leader of the abolitionist movement. In this book, he succeeds in renovating the reputation of a great reformer and activist who has often been neglected or written off as a crank.

   Garrison and the abolitionists were originally hardly more popular in the North than in the South. They were seen as disrupting the Union and were regarded with suspicion for their pro-black beliefs - public opinion in the North was only marginally less racist than in Dixie. Garrison's courage and consistent refusal to trim his convictions for popular acceptance led to a career with an outsized share of controversy, oppobrium, and in several cases physical danger.

   Some reviewers have felt the book is too long, and it is hefty. But the length is necessary for Mayer to give a full portrait, which shows not only the man, but also the era he lived in. In particular, Mayer writes extensively about abolitionism as a movement. Abolitionists, and Garrison himself, struggled with many problems - whether to compromise by supporting politicians whose platforms called for less than full abolition, evolving from a paternalist movement of mostly privileged whites to a movement in which free blacks and escaped slaves could play a meaningful role, and reconciling the pacifist leanings of many to their role in a war against slaveholders - that will be of interest to contemporary political activists. Mayer also shows how, after abolition was accomplished, former abolitionists seeking new causes worked for other advances, including the first stirrings of the women's suffrage movement.

1 comments about Hospital Days: Reminiscence of a Civil War Nurse.

1. This must be the best book on the Civil War written by a woman! The layout is incredible. Every one should read this book