1 comments about Elizabeth I.

1. Elizabeth I is, perhaps, the English monarch that has caught the interest of more people than any other British ruler has before. David Loades has managed to write a detailed record of her reign and life that covers not only the facts, but also presents and analyzes the many hypotheses that historians have come up with over years of research.
   
   The opening chapter of the book details the circumstances of Elizabeth's birth and goes on to explain how she eventually was recognized as the rightful heir to the throne. The following four chapters describe the events of her rise to power, and the middle section covers her forty-year reign. The final chapter examines the reasons for Elizabeth's success.
   
   The book is written in a very analytical manner, especially on Elizabeth's motives for the actions she took as queen of England. It also provides a substantial amount of background information on other important figures, such as Henry VIII, Mary, and Catherine.
   
   On the whole, David Loades' biography is a thorough and fascinating read for those who want to delve into the intriguing story of Elizabeth I.

No comments about More Letters of Charles Darwin: A record of his work in a series of hitherto unpublished letters. Volume 2.

1 comments about AUDACIOUS ADMIRAL COCHRANE: The True Life of a Naval Legend.

1. Brian Vale has produced a much needed `semi-revisionist' account of the life of Lord Cochrane. I say `much needed' because most previous works have, as the author argues, more or less uncritically used as their sources the accounts left behind by the intrepid sailor or his partisans. Thus the version of history propounded by Cochrane has become the orthodoxy.
   
   I use the phrase `semi-revisionist' because whilst Brian Vale has, through painstaking scholarship, set the record straight on several issues, he has in no way undertaken an exercise in `debunking.' In fact, I would argue, the subject emerges from this piece of work a much more rounded character than is the case with many previous exercises.
   
   One aspect that is investigated in some depth is the Gambier Court Martial, brought about by Cochrane's reluctance to see the admiral thanked by parliament for his part in the Battle of Basque/Aix Roads on 12 April 1809. To Cochrane, Gambier was guilty of the gravest dereliction of duty and worthy only of censure, not thanks. Gambier was acquitted of all wrongdoing, and to the end of his life Cochrane was bitter about what he considered to be the rigging of the Court Martial. Indeed his autobiography, published half a century later, contains thousands of words of analysis of the evidence, and it is upon this partisan interpretation that most subsequent accounts have been based and from which the orthodox view has arisen.
   
   This view has now been challenged, and the evidence presented to the Court Martial sifted by Vale's critical mind, leading to a more balanced conclusion. For example, as he points out, of the seventeen commanders of individual vessels present at the scene only six, including Cochrane, were of the view that Gambier was wrong in not sending heavy ships into the restricted waters of Aix Roads. Thus: `the majority of senior British professionals who were on the spot [. . .] backed Gambier's refusal to take risks.'
   
   Certainly Gambier was cautious, and whether or not he was correct in his conduct is certainly debatable. However, he had been in ultimate command during an operation that eliminated the threat from an enemy `fleet in being', and he had preserved his own fleet and freedom of action. He was then unquestionably the victor, but it was not a smashing victory such as Nelson might have achieved, and which Cochrane wanted.
   
   Brian Vale is the first authority, to my knowledge, that has come down on Gambier's side in this argument after employing detailed scrutiny; he is almost certainly correct.
   
   Gambier's Court Martial, despite being intimately related to the battle, seems however less susceptible to revision. The weight of witness opinion, as expressed in numbers holding `for' and `against' views, did not of itself make a decision inevitable one way or the other. However, given that, as Vale himself puts it, there were `undercurrents' at the trial because `the idea that a commander-in-chief could be court-martialled because a junior officer disagreed with his actions was anathema', it seems probable that there was, at least, a predisposition amongst the panel towards upholding the authority of Gambier, and thus established authority in general.
   
   This was, it may be recalled, a time when criticism of the political and social status quo resulted in prosecution and imprisonment. It is therefore legitimate to conclude that established authority, in pronouncing judgement on a matter of authority, would have been most unlikely to come to a decision, whatever the evidence, that would support subversion of authority. It is almost certain that Cochrane could never have been allowed to discredit Gambier, not because of who he was or what he had done, or not done, but because of what he represented.
   
   Already believing that he was the victim of persecution, the Gambier Court Martial drove Cochrane to an occasional state of near paranoia; a state he laboured under for almost the rest of his life. Brian Vale concludes that in many cases this state of mind led Cochrane to erroneous conclusions, inasmuch as he tended to take disagreement with his views as evidence of personal animus.
   
   Whilst there is evidence that this was indeed the case on occasion, unfortunately the author does not give us his analysis of one particular episode that Cochrane used as an example of the `authorities' persecution of him; the case of the convoy lamp. Having been assigned to convoy duty Cochrane had applied his mind to the difficulties of keeping a convoy in some kind of order at night. He devised a powerful lamp that would act as a beacon on the leading ship, a device he offered to the Admiralty but which was rejected. The same Admiralty shortly afterwards offered a prize of £50 for the design of such a light. Cochrane submitted his invention under a false name and it won the competition. However when the true designer became known `not a lamp was ever ordered.'
   
   The episode, given that the above is a correct account, is perhaps evidence that not all Cochrane's fears were imaginary.
   
   Cochrane was undoubtedly a maverick whose qualities were enormous, with the almost inevitable corollary that so were his faults. His genius, which is not too strong a term, for making war was counterbalanced by his utter failure to exhibit even a modicum of discretion when dealing with his superiors, and, predictably, the latter defect often led to the negation of the former quality.
   
   Brain Vale brings formidable scholarship to bear on his subject and has produced a book that is essential, and excellent, reading for anyone with an interest in the `The Audacious Admiral Cochrane.' I say this despite having one minor quibble; though grateful to be cited in such an impressive work, I would have been even more grateful if the author had spelled my name correctly!

2 comments about Haig: A Reappraisal 70 Years on.

1. 
   T. S. Wing "bookworm" (Down Under) Reads a lot of books on Douglas Haig.Seems he/she hates everyone British.
   The common curse of mankind, - folly and ignorance.



2. This is probably, next to Terraine's biography, the worst revisionist nonsense on that incompetent, Douglas Haig. In it, Haig's idiotic human wave assaults are said to be the only sensible tactics, his staying miles behind the front as the only sensible way to conduct war, and his intrigues as fot the greater good.
   
   Pure, unadulterated crap.

No comments about Country Days.

3 comments about With Love from Diana: the Princess of Wales' Personal Astrologer Shares Her First-Hand Account of Diana's Turbulent Years.

1. I'm not saying that people don't have spiritual gifts, but I do question much of Penny Thornton's vision. I must agree with the previous "critic", however, regarding the dream about the car: it shocked me so, that I read it over and over and got tears in my eyes; (if this part is pure fiction, I would have a terrific bone to pick with Ms. Thornton about lies and playing with another's emotions!).The book is a good enough read, but nothing spectacular.



2. Author Penny Thornton describes 2 dreams she had in 1986 or '87, in which Diana is seen with "a white car moving ahead, leaving the black car behind." Consider that this book was published two years BEFORE Diana's accident, and this is nothing short of phenomenal!! Several other parellels occur in these 2 dreams, as well. This is a book worth reading for those who can't get enough of Diana.



3. I feel that Andrew morton protrayed Princess Daina as the Angel that we all knew of that helped those in need. I espesially enjoyed the chapter "My cries for help" talking of her problems with Prince Charles and her marriage. And that of her Bulimia. I would like to take this moment to thank Andrew Morton. For his kind words, and his honesty about Princess Diana. Sincerley, Catherine M. Catron

No comments about Mary Anne Disraeli or the Story of Viscountess Beaconsfield.

5 comments about Michael Collins and the Troubles: The Struggle for Irish Freedom 1912-1922.

1. I didn't mean to read this book. I had bought it for someone else but it never quite got there. Ulick O'Connor begins by relating a little of his own family's history and then goes into what can only be called a chronological ramble about Irish history.

   This is by no means a biography of Michael Collins. In fact very little of the book is spent on Michael Collins himself. It is however an engaging conversation on the history of Ireland in the early 1900's.

   This conversational style is hard to follow. To get something out of this book you must read it as though you are listening to a witness describe to you what happened in those critical days and do it over a pint of Guinness. If you can read the book in that perspective you will find that you have been given a personal introduction to the many men and women that drove the Irish freedom movement to the front of the world stage.

   The author writes in a style that feels very personal. Not so much history but a story. A tale of people that were and are important to the author. However, because its so personal it is not very balanced. This is a tale of Irish Repulicans told by an Irish Repulican. No love is lost on the British Government or the Ulster Unionists.

   I cannot recommend this book as a starting point for studying the history of the Irish rebellions and the roots of the IRA and Sinn Fein. I can however recommend this book as an excellent addition to a well rounded education on the topic.




2. If you've wanted to know about Michael Collins but all you've ever seen was the movie (dramatization) this is a great primer book for his background. I think Tim Pat Coogan's book is better for an in depth analysis of Mr. Collins. I've just started that one but would recommend it as well.



3. O'Connor's title suggests that this book is strictly a biography of Michael Collins focused on the years 1912 through 1922. In actuality, it covers a wide range of people and events and I cannot recommend it strictly as a Collins biography. However, as a history book that happens to have an emphasis on Collins, particularly in the latter part, I can recommend it. O'Connor has relied on materials from the library of General Richard Mulcahy (the IRA's chief of staff in Collins' time) and on interviews with Eamon de Valera, et al. For those reasons alone, I believe it is worth at least a cursory glance. Because of O'Connor's interest in and work for the Abbey Theatre, this book does emphasize literature and the arts in terms of how they fueled the independence movement. For someone interested in humanities as well as history, this would be one of O'Connor's advantages. This selection is divided only into numbered chapters rather than parts and that can be a bit irritating at times, especially because this is not a traditional biography. Chapter One actually begins by discussing Charles Stewart Parnell and the untimely end of his career. From there, the reader is taken quickly through the Irish political climate from the late 1800s to 1912. It is not until the last third of the book that the audience learns of specific ways Collins kept the republican struggle afloat in tough times. Therefore, this book's usefulness can only be determined by what you intend to use it for. If you are trying to accumulate materials for a general study of modern Irish history, this book is worth owning. If you are looking for a typical Collins biography, this wouldn't be the best starting point.



4. When I got the book I thought it would be more on Michael Collins . Despite this I thought it was a good book that help put into to prespective the events and people around him.



5. Of the several biographies I have read of the life of Michael Collins, this one does not stand up. Frought with inaccuracies as to dates, as well as circumstances, O'Connor replaces research with recollection and opinion. There are several other great biographies of this most important Irish figure. Avoid this one.

3 comments about Oliver Cromwell (Reputations Series).

1. Oliver Cromwell will forever remain an engimatic figure as he was both a reluctant leader and a military dictator at the same time. Davis' look into his lifely is incredibly fraught with attempts to justify his actions as being for the overall "good" despite how much "evil" he committed. While I do not believe that this is a book to "condone the war in Iraq" as one reviewer put it, it is extremely biased and any researcher using it must be careful not to take everything Davis' says to heart. As my favorite English professor used to say, "Take everything written with a grain of salt." What is a fact is that Mr. Davis is an extremely well versed historian and expert on Oliver Cromwell. It can also be a difficult read if you have no interest in the time period, the man and feel no love toward Cromwell. Otherwise, it is something every European historian should own.



2. I have always been interested in European history, particuarly English History. I bought this book with the hopes of learning objectively (or at least as objective as a person can be) about a truly forceful and powerful man. For better or for worse, Cromwell was certainly a tranformative individual in the course of human history.
   
   I was disappointed in a big way. The author spends a lot of time trying to absolve Olvier Cromwell of any guilt, claiming that what's publicly known about Cromwell is simply the "Public" story.
   
   So what was the great unveiling of knowledge that will exhonerate Oliver Cromwell? According to the author, well, he was a religious man after all. Somehow in the authors mind (and many other unfortunatly) being religious presupposes ethics, honesty and integrity - all in the name of God to massacre people. Are we to write-off all the misdeeds he did to his fellow man because he was religious? If anything, religion has been used against man as a weapon for cruelty, torture, subjegation and killings. According to the author the argument boils down to this: Cromwell was a religious man, like our illustrious president, Dubya, Who feels it necessary to translate the word of God for us plebians, and feels justified to act according to the messages he received. Its these dangerous justifications that have caused a great deal of danger to this planet. It makes you wonder how the Religious Right will one day interpret this invasion of Iraq.



3. Cromwell is an amazingly enigmatic figure in spite of an incredibly public career. He was revered and feared by the people around him to the point where they could not know him the way they knew each other - from the time he assumed the leadership of the English Revolution, he became an object of awe, a force of nature, a figure so much larger than life that he seemed above even the most extraordinary of his peers. This book goes a long way toward helping the reader understand Cromwell the man riding the crest of English history.

4 comments about Sir John Fisher's Naval Revolution (Studies in Maritime History).

1. In Sir John Fisher's Naval Revolution Nicholas Lambert has provided a comprehensive analysis of the policies of Admiral Sir John Fisher and the Royal Navy in the ten years before the outbreak of World War One. Displaying a remarkable command of the source documents Lambert examines grand strategy, tactical concepts, national financial policy and politics with great skill and fluidly moves between these seemingly disparate subjects with ease. It becomes apparent as Lambert dissects events that much of the research that has went on before on this subject and which forms the basis for many people's ideas about era is superficial and incomplete.
   
   This is a complicated subject but Lambert's grasp of narrative and clean clear prose makes it easy for the interested reader to follow the string through the maze that was British naval policy in the Fisher era. Lambert makes it clear that Fisher was not appointed First Sea Lord in 1904 to introduce the dreadnought battleship/battlecruiser but to cut naval spending. This fact spurred Fisher to introduce new technologies to maintain Britain's naval supremacy when that supremacy was increasingly under threat from a number of quarters. Lambert puts emphasis on Fisher's ideas about the use of flotilla craft. These were small submersible boats and surface craft armed with torpedoes that could close the narrow seas around the British Isles to enemy battle fleets thus freeing the British fleet to roam the high seas, bringing battle to the enemy and protecting her own huge ocean trade. Lambert shows how on the eve of the war, the Royal Navy was on the verge of stopping battleship construction altogether on favor of flotilla craft. This is new ground.
   
   Fisher was faced with four other areas of crisis which this book delves into: financial constraints, manpower limitations, ship deployment policies and forging new tactics that would take advantage of the developing technology that was changing the face of naval warfare. Lambert also makes clear that the senior officers of the Royal Navy in the decade before the war were not operating in an intellectual vacuum, countering the unfortunate impression that many historians have fostered that the navy was resistant to new technology, unable to think critically, and too lazy for deep analysis and staff work. While a number of hidebound ignoramuses had managed to reach high command, most senior officers were energetically working to exploit the emergent technologies to the full extent.
   
   Lambert's story of the Royal Navy before 1914 presents a picture completely different from the accepted one. It is one that is wholly convincing and presents a more satisfying explanation of what happened, and why, than we have had before. I recommend this book to those who are familiar with the subject and have a desire to go deeper into it. You won't be sorry.



2. This is a superby researched book, though it falls flat on its major premise, that Fisher and the Royal Navy were ahead of the times in terms of naval strategy, armaments or hwat not.
   
   Also the book is a misnomer, as it's more on the rivalries amongst the Board of Amiralty than on Fisher, and its dubious claim that Fisher pioneered the so called "flotilla defense" by submarines and torpedo boats stretches credulity, as Fisher is notorious for NOT beleving in a Naval War Staff, or any war plans at all.
   
   The author also neglects, being a fan of Fisher, to point out that the latter's morbid fascination with "battle cruiser" led to the fiasco in Jutland, though all British historians and apologist will claim that they may have lost a battle there, but ultimately won the war!



3. An interesting book on the politics of defense spending and its relationship with grand strategy and domestic politics. Tedious at times, and often unbalanced as to proving the grand point and instead focusing on partisan minutae, this book is still interesting to consider; you have to commend Lambert for his exaustive research behind the common assumptions. He did major work in the primary sources.

   The point is that much of the arms race theory before WWI is not genuinely correct. The motivations for the growth and posturing of the British Navy prior to WWI had less to do with fear of Germany -although using that fear was an effective tool- than with a naval revolution by the Admiralty's First Lord, Sir John Fisher. It is an intersting foray into the dynamics of defense spending politics, and how that ultimately impacts capabilities and strategy.




4. This is a major revisionist interpretation of British naval policy as conceived and carried out by Admiral Sir John Fisher as First Sea Lord between late 1904 and early 1910. In fact, there appears to be hardly a single conventional assumption about Fisher's policies, and the policies and technical flexibility of the Admiralty during this period that is not subject to reconsideration in the book.

   What I found most interesting was the startling - to me - degree to which senior British naval officers readily accepted the potential for torpedo-armed submarine and destroyer flotillas to change naval warfare, and the amount of effort they were willing to put into devising ways to use this revolutionary potential to reinforce British naval supremacy. The book is filled with descriptions of British investment in submarine technology and the ongoing discussions between naval officers of ways to adapt that technology to British needs.

   According to the book, Fisher's planned great revolution in naval warfare was not intended to be the Dreadnought battleship that his name is still commonly associated with. Instead it was to be a British fleet made up of a combination of battlecruisers with Dreadnought-scale heavy armament, great speed, and excellent gun laying based on analogue computers, designed for overseas force projection; and a submarines and destroyer flotillas designed and deployed for protection of Great Britain and such other narrow seas where they could be used to bottle up potential enemy forces. This assertion is thoroughly backed up with detailed quotes from personal letters and Admiralty memos and position papers, plus the evidence of how Fisher spent funds available to him.

   The plans of Admiral Fisher and others in the British Admiralty were developed in largely hostile political environment. The British government during this period, and the opposition political parties, were intent on reducing British naval expenditures, and not at all interested in developing the ability to expand British ability to project naval force overseas. Therefore, Fisher and his allies had to act largely in secret, while disguising their true goals from most of their political masters.

   This book has a lot of trees in its forest. I did not find it easy reading, and I would not recommend it to someone with only casual interest in British naval history or the history of naval technology. To fully understand appreciate the book's thesis and scope, the reader must be willing to delve along with the book's author into British domestic politics, British foreign policy, and a host of technical issues beyond those mentioned above. I personally found it difficult at first to fully understand why, given that Fisher had much of the Admiralty behind him, and that Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty from 1910 up to 1915, also had great faith in submarine and destroyer flotillas to control narrow seas, the Royal Navy didn't manage to make the changeover desired by Admiral Fisher. The way I finally understood it, it comes down to one basic fact, Fisher, Churchill and their allies in the Admiralty simply did not have enough time. Not enough time to educate and prepare the politicians and the British public, not enough time to nurture the necessary submarine building industry in Britain or in one of the Dominions, and not enough time to guarantee a completely united front in the Admiralty needed to quickly push through such radical change in naval policy. Given that it was less than a decade between Fisher's appointment as First Sea Lord and the outbreak of WWI, that is probably reason enough.